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PLAY BALL? AN ANALYSIS OF FINAL-
OFFER ARBITRATION, ITS USE IN MAJOR
LEAGUE BASEBALL AND ITS POTENTIAL
APPLICABILITY TO EUROPEAN FOOTBALL
WAGE AND TRANSFER DISPUTES
JOSH CHETWYND*
I. INTRODUCTION
The game of baseball does not allow for draws. One team is victorious
and the other loses. As a result, it should not be surprising that when it comes
to wage disputes, the sport's preeminent professional league, Major League
Baseball, turns to final-offer arbitration (FOA). This type of dispute resolution
forces an arbitrator, or panel of arbitrators, to pick either one party's offer or
the other's. In theory, like the game of baseball itself, there is one winner and
one loser. But a deeper analysis of this form of arbitration suggests that, in
fact, applying FOA can lead to a win-win situation as it spurs negotiated
settlement at a very high rate. In its Major League Baseball milieu, FOA,
which is often referred to as "baseball arbitration" because of its use in this
setting, has also proved to be particularly useful in assuring that all disputes
are quickly resolved, either through mutual agreement between the parties or
speedy hearings. This alacrity, which appears to have been one of the main
characteristics the system's architects intended, suggests that it might be useful
for other sports as well. In the context of Europe, it raises the question: could
a form of arbitration named after America's national pastime serve as a
valuable tool for the world's game? Could European football's wage and
transfer system I benefit from a speedy system that spurs settlement?
This Article examines these issues. Part I delves into the general
development and mechanics of FOA. Part II considers its use in Major
League Baseball and assesses whether FOA has achieved the goals it was
* Josh Chetwynd is a 2006 graduate of University of Arizona's James E. Rogers College of
Law, cum laude. His article on final-offer arbitration was adapted from his 2009 L.L.M dissertation
at the London School of Economics. He has written two books on international baseball, including
BASEBALL IN EUROPE: A COUNTY BY COUNTRY HISTORY and previously worked for Major League
Baseball in its London Office. He also served as a staff reporter for such publications as USA Today
and U.S. News & World Report.
1. The transfer system is the key way in which wages are determined in European football. The
system is discussed in detail infra Part III of this Article.
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intended to satisfy. Part III takes up FOA's potential applicability to European
football's salary and transfer systems. Throughout, this Article also addresses
criticisms raised about this style of dispute resolution.
II. FINAL-OFFER ARBITRATION: GENERAL OVERVIEW
A. Early History and Basic Theoretical Framework
FOA is a form of arbitration also known as "either-or," "last-best-offer,"
"one-or-the other," "flip-flop," "straight offer," or "pendulum" arbitration. 2 It
has been described as "baseball arbitration" as well because Major League
Baseball uses a version of the procedure in resolving salary disputes. 3 FOA's
process differs fundamentally from conventional arbitration. In the
conventional method, an arbitrator has the flexibility to impose any award he
or she deems appropriate. 4 In contrast, in FOA, the arbitrator must choose
either one party's or the other party's final offer. 5
FOA was first proposed abstractly in the United States in the late 1940s as
a tool for preventing large-scale labor strikes, which government officials
feared could precipitate national emergencies. 6 There were discussions about
using some type of FOA mechanism to impose settlements as an alternative to
the Taft-Hartley dispute resolution procedures enacted by the U.S. Congress in
1947.7 Ultimately, American politicians decided not to make this change.
The concept remained essentially dormant until 1966, when economics
professor Carl Stevens provided the first theoretical analysis on the subject. 8
His work and those of later supporters of FOA assert that the system's greatest
2. Gary Long & Peter Feuille, Final-Offer Arbitration: "Sudden Death " in Eugene, 27 INDUS. &
LAB. REL. REV. 186, 187 (1974); Sid Kessler, The Swings and Roundabouts of Pendulum Arbitration,
PERSONNEL MGMT, Dec. 1987, at 39.
3. California Dept. of Indus. Relations, Literature Review: Final Offer Arbitration, available at
www.dir.ca.gov/chswc/Basebal.ArbFfmal.htm (last visited Sept. 25, 2009).
4. Id.
5. Bogachan Celen, Final Offer Arbitration with Multiple Issues 2, 2 (Nov. 14, 2003),
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://celen.admin.fas.nyu.edu/pdfs/foa.pdf.
6. JAMES DWORKIN, OWNERS VERSUS PLAYERS: BASEBALL AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 145
(1981).
7. Id. Taft-Hartley, formally known as the Labor-Management Relations Act, included elements
aimed at preventing unions from initiating work stoppages, which government officials feared would
slow the country's post-World War II industrial boom. See 29 U.S.C. § 157-58 (2009).
8. See generally Carl M. Stevens, Is Compulsory Arbitration Compatible with Bargaining?, 5
INDUS. REL. 38 (1966); see also Craig E. Overton & Max S. Worman, Compulsory Arbitration: A
Strike Alternative for Police?, 29 ARB. J. 33, 34 (1974) (noting that the path to final offer arbitration
(FOA) was paved by a general movement toward using binding, compulsory arbitration between
states and public impasses).
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value is its ability to encourage negotiated settlements at a greater rate than
conventional arbitration. Negotiated settlements are preferred because they
leave the final decision making in the hands of the parties rather than a third
party. This avoids the cost of an arbitration hearing and presumably gives the
parties a more satisfying result than an imposed decision. 9
Stevens argued that FOA was superior at securing settlement compared to
conventional arbitration because, in the traditional setting, arbitrators tend to
"split the difference" between each side's offer. In other words, if one party
offered $100,000 in a salary dispute and the opposing side presented a figure
of $500,000, the arbitrator would settle on an award of $300,000. 10
This creates a "chilling effect" on negotiated settlement as the two parties
tend to proffer extreme offers and assume the arbitrator will ultimately come
to some middle ground in his or her award-something that can not occur in the
"either-or" format of FOA.I1 Stevens further believed that parties would opt
for settlement because in the FOA setting, as a general rule, neither side is
given an indication on how the arbitrator will react to their final offers. FOA,
wrote Stevens, "generates just the kind of uncertainty.., that is well
calculated to ... compel [the parties] to seek security in agreement."12
But what about situations when parties cannot reach settlement?
Proponents argue that despite the arbitrator's lack of flexibility, the offers on
the table would still lead to a fair result. FOA achieves this goal by nudging
the parties toward their most reasonable offer. The reason: To do otherwise
when the arbitrator can only pick one side or the other would mean a likely
"loss" at the arbitrator's table. According to FOA writer Henry Farber:
Given the FOA decision rule for selection of the award, each
party faces a fundamental trade-off in setting its final offer: In
submitting a more 'reasonable' final offer a party is gaining
some probability that its offer will be selected while giving up
some utility if its offers [sic] is selected. 13
9. See Stevens, supra note 8, at 46.
10. One early empirical study found that splitting the difference was a regular occurrence when
the conventional format was used in compulsory bargaining. In research on fire fighter arbitrations
across the United States, University of Wyoming academic Hoyt Wheeler found, among other results,
that in 82.6% of all wage cases, the arbitrator chose a middle point in his or her award. See Hoyt N.
Wheeler, Is Compromise the Rule in Fire Fighter Arbitration?, 29 ARB. J. 176, 179 (1974).
11. Clifford B. Donn, Games Final-Offer Arbitrators Might Play, 16 INDUS. REL. 306, 306-07
(1977).
12. See Stevens, supra note 8, at 46.
13. Henry S. Farber, An Analysis of Final-Offer Arbitration, 24 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 683, 685
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Or, as Stevens put it: "[E]ach party may assume that the arbitrator will reject
an 'exaggerated' position in favor of an opponent's more moderate claim." 14
The initial reaction to FOA from negotiating professionals was not
completely positive. "[T]he suggestion was not received with overwhelming
enthusiasm by the labor-relations community - indeed, there was a tendency
to write it off as an unworkable 'gimmick,"' recounted Stevens a decade after
his seminal paper. 15
B. Structure and Historical Development
Nevertheless, by the early 1970s states and municipalities as well as Major
League Baseball had embraced the approach. In America's public sector some
states, such as Wisconsin and Michigan, instituted FOA as a form of
compulsory arbitration "to resolve labor-management bargaining disputes
when the union is legally prohibited (as are, for example, many public
employees' unions) from striking."' 16 In these situations, the arbitrator was
brought in if there was a negotiation breakdown and his or her award decision
was binding. 17
In instances where more than one issue was in dispute, two forms of FOA
emerged during this period: package and issue-by-issue FOA. 18 In the
package format, both parties submit an offer covering every issue in dispute,
and the arbitrator chooses one complete package or the other. 19 Issue-by-issue
allows the arbitrator more flexibility.20 On each discreet issue the arbitrator
must choose one side's offer, but a compromise of awarding some issues to
one side and others to the opposing side is permissible. 2
1
The main criticism for package FOA is the extreme risk involved in the
process. 22  It "prevents neutrals from imposing their view of desirable
compromises upon the parties, a freedom they enjoy under issue-by-issue
(1980).
14. See Stevens, supra note 8, at 46.
15. Carl Stevens, Final Offer Arbitration, 49 J. BUS. 574, 575 (1976) (hereinafter Stevens II).
16. Vincent P. Crawford, Arbitration and Conflict Resolution in Labor-Management Bargaining,
71 AM. ECON. REv. 205 (1981). Major League Baseball's FOA history, which began in 1974, will be
discussed infra Part II.
17. Id.
18. Farber, supra note 13, at 684.
19. Elissa M. Meth, Final Offer Arbitration: A Model for Dispute Resolution in Domestic and
International Disputes, 10 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 383, 394 (1999).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 395.
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FOA, conventional arbitration and litigation." 23 Issue-by-issue suffers from
the opposite effect:
[T]he arbitrator has flexibility to create a balanced award; as
the number of issues in dispute increases, however, the
characteristics of issue-by-issue FOA begin to mirror
conventional arbitration. For example, if there are many
issues in dispute, an arbitrator can balance the number decided
in favor of each party; this potential dilutes the high
settlement pressure FOA should impose on parties due to the
neutral's inability to compromise. 24
Empirically, both formats had early success. In 1972, Michigan adopted
the issue-by-issue approach and found an immediate increase in negotiated
settlements. 25 Under conventional arbitration, the parties settled thirty-nine
percent of disputes after the parties requested arbitration but before the
arbitrator made a determination. With FOA, that number increased to sixty-
four percent. 26 In Wisconsin, where package FOA was implemented the total
amount of imposed arbitration awards required was almost exactly the same as
those in Michigan.27 Despite the constraining nature of the package process,
the reviews in Wisconsin were positive. "A widespread theoretical fear about
final-offer-by-package has been that the arbitrator might be constrained to
choose between two packages each of which was in some respect
'outrageous.' In practice in Wisconsin, the problem has not materialized,"
Stevens concluded. 28  Since then, states have not necessarily shown a
preference for one format or the other. In 2003, for example, Connecticut,
Iowa and Michigan reportedly used issue-by-issue FOA, while Minnesota,
Nevada, New Jersey and Wisconsin embraced package FOA in their public
sector bargaining.29
Over time, a variety of FOA mechanisms and procedural elements have
emerged. For example, using dual final offers is an option. 30 This facet is an
attempt to minimize some of the risk involved in the FOA approach as each
23. Id.
24. Id. at 394.
25. Stevens II, supra note 15, at 575.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Celen, supra note 5, at 3.
30. Meth, supra note 19, at 396.
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party gives the arbitrator two options to pick from rather than one absolute,
final choice. 31  Some studies on this strategy indicate that the additional
information gleaned from two offers helps facilitate settlements. 32
Independent fact finders have also been employed by a number of U.S. state
public sectors, including Iowa, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin. 33 Generally
speaking, the fact-finder evaluates each party's proposals and, in some
instances, offers recommendations to the arbitrator, which are considered
along with the parties' final offers.34 This feature can help some parties
narrow their disputes and, in some cases, provide a clearer path to negotiated
settlement. 35 On the negative side, one study found that the fact-finder tended
to wield too much influence over an arbitrators final decision, while other
research suggested that the fact-finder's research led to parties amending their
final offers. 36 This effectively moves FOA in the direction of conventional
arbitration and removes a good deal of the calculated uncertainty Stevens
claimed as a key reason for high incidents of negotiated settlement. 37
Combining FOA with other forms of alternative dispute resolution
mechanisms is also a technique used by some states in the United States. For
instance, Wisconsin implemented a system in which the state's Labor and
Industry Review Commission investigated the dispute, offered mediation if
there was an impasse, and then used FOA as a final option. 38 In other states,
there is the option of using various forms of FOA or conventional arbitration.
New Jersey's Employer-Employee Relations Act gives parties a menu of six
arbitration options, including five that use various forms of FOA - from issue-
by-issue to package FOA to hybrid approaches that utilize both forms. 39
As is the case with conventional arbitration, various arbitration panel
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. See IOWA CODE § 20.22 (2009); see PA. STAT. ANN. § 11-1123-A (2009); see also WIS.
STAT. § 111.77 (2007-2008).
34. Meth, supra note 19, at 396.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 397.
37. Id. at 397.
38. WIS. STAT. § 111.77. It is worth noting that parties were permitted to use conventional
arbitration as the final form of resolution, but FOA was the default.
39. See N.J. STAT. § 34:13A-16 (2008). The six options are: (1) conventional arbitration on all
issues; (2) the arbitrator chooses between the single package final offer proffered by the employer and
the employees' representative; (3) the arbitrator decides matters through issue-by-issue FOA; (4) the
arbitrator chooses a single final package between three options: the employers' offer, the employees'
offer and an independent fact-finder's offer; (5) issue-by-issue FOA is used with a choice being made
for issue between offers from each party as well as a fact-finder; and (6) Package FOA is used for
economic issues, while non-economic issues are decided issue-by-issue.
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structures have been used in the FOA setting. Most FOA structures employ
either a single arbitrator or a three-person panel. 40 In the single arbitrator set-
up, the individual is neutral and without any relationship to either party. But
three-arbitrator panels vary in their composition. For example, in Eugene,
Oregon, FOA arbitration panels have been comprised of a representative for
each party and a neutral chairperson. 41 Three-person panels have also been
chosen based on expertise. In a FOA proceeding involving the United States's
Internal Revenue Service and Apple Computer, each of the three arbitrators
were picked because of their special knowledge of different aspects of the
dispute. 42 Finally, three neutral arbitrators is a popular option and is, most
notably, currently used in the Major League Baseball structure. 43
C. Criticisms
Despite being practically embraced throughout the United States, some
theorists have expressed doubts about the value of FOA. As discussed above,
supporters of this form of arbitration assert that FOA encourages a
convergence of final offers between the two parties. 44 This should make it
easier for the two sides to come to a negotiated settlement, as their offers
should be closer together than in the conventional format. Also, if there is an
imposed settlement, the losing parties should be somewhat pacified by the fact
that the award should not differ too greatly from that party's offer. The
contention that parties will make offers that tend to close the differential gap
was supported by a number of theorists.45 As one writer explained, the value
of FOA is "[e]ach party believes that a concession increases the probability of
the arbitrator choosing its offer as the award, a probability each party can
know only with uncertainty. Each increment to that perceived probability
increases a party's utility." 46
40. Meth, supra note 19, at 399.
41. Long, supra note 2, at 192.
42. After Successful Use of Baseball Arbitration, Apple, IRS Both Declare Themselves Winners,
11 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. Dec. 1993, at 163-4. The three arbitrators in the case were
an economist, an industry expert, and a former federal judge. Id.
43. Id.
44. See Peter Feuille, Final-Offer Arbitration and the Chilling Effect, 14 INDUS. REL. 302, 305
(1975).
45. See ScoTT ROSNER & KENNETH SHROPSHIRE, THE BUSINESS OF SPORT 269-72, 271, 233
(2004); see generally id.; Craig A. Olson, Does Final-Offer Arbitration Allow Bargaining that
Conventional Arbitration Chills?, 102 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 38 (1979); Paul D. Staudohar, Results of
Final-Offer Arbitration, 18 CAL. MGMT. REV. 57 (1975); Henry S. Farber & Max H. Bazerman,
Divergent Expectations as a Cause of Disagreement in Bargaining: Evidence from a Comparison of
Arbitration Schemes, 104 Q. J. ECON. 99 (1989).
46. Donn, supra note 11, at 308.
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But in what has been described as a "significant disagreement between
labor relations theorists and those in the decision sciences," decision scientists
have written that FOA creates divergence in final offers. 47 After considering
the mathematical properties of FOA, these academics found there is "little
truth to this [convergence] theory: divergence, rather than convergence, of
equilibrium strategies is the norm." 48 Steven Brains's and Samuel Merrill's
study of FOA concluded that the "optimal strategies [in FOA] not only
preclude a median settlement but may well encourage sharply divergent bids
antithetical to reconciliation." 49 They argued that assuming both sides are
risk-neutral in a zero-sum game, parties will try to stay within the realm of a
reasonable offer, but will attempt to go to the maximum edge of that realm,
leading to diverging, rather than converging, offers.
Although empirical data had indicated that convergence was often
occurring, authors Jay Coleman, Kenneth Jennings and Frank McLaughlin
(hereinafter "Coleman") found little fault in the models supporting divergence.
"It is difficult to make th[e] argument [of convergence] after considering the
wide range of distributions investigated. . ..." wrote Coleman. 50  Ultimately,
the explanation for the seemingly illogical movement toward convergence
(despite modeling suggesting divergence should occur) had to do with the fact
that parties can actually derive great value by submitting offers that do not
meet their Nash equilibrium, concluded Coleman. 51 Usually, parties look to
maximize their utility with their respective bids. In those instances, "the Nash
Equilibrium set of final offers is that pair of final offers which has the property
that neither party can achieve a higher expected utility by changing its final
offer." 52
But Coleman contended that non-quantifiable factors beyond finding
maximum utility usually play a role in a party's offer.5 3 In order to maximize
those outside elements (such as good continuing relations with the opposing
party), one side will likely alter their bid toward convergence. 54 This occurs,
Coleman found, because the willingness to converge, even by a large amount,
47. Jay B. Coleman et al., Convergence or Divergence in Final-Offer Arbitration in Professional
Baseball, 32 INDUS. REL. 238, 239 (1993).
48. Steven J. Brains & Samuel Merrill III, Equilibrium Strategies for Final-Offer Arbitration:
There is No Median Convergence, 29 MGMT. SC. 927, 927 (1993).
49. Id. at 940.
50. Coleman, supra note 47, at 241.
51. Id.
52. Farber, supra note 13, at 690.
53. Coleman, supra note 47, at 240-44.
54. Id. at 244.
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in order to maximize outside factors did very little to change ultimate costs.55
"In other words, a considerable change in salary offer in the direction of the
other party (i.e., convergence) has very small effects on the expected value of
the ultimate award," Coleman wrote. 56 "The primary implication is that this
insensitivity leaves both parties the opportunity to indulge objectives other
than EMV [expected monetary value] maximization. 57 In the presence of
other sufficient objectives and motivations for the parties to settle,
convergence of offers is the likely result." 58
D. Summary (Part I)
While the debate over convergence and divergence has not been
definitively resolved, it has not staunched the growth of FOA. From its roots
in the United States, variations of FOA are now practiced in such countries as
the United Kingdom, New Zealand and Canada. 59 Even with the fear of
divergence, the value of high incidents of settlement trumps those concerns
and has led to the growth of this form of arbitration throughout parts of the
world.
Ill. MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL AND FINAL-OFFER ARBITRATION
A. Labor history
It is unlikely that any organization or government entity draws on the FOA
process more regularly than Major League Baseball. 60 To appreciate how
55. Id.
56. Id. at 244.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 244-45. In Coleman's modeling, he and his team found that offers that deviate from the
optimal offer impact the expected monetary value, also known as expected cost, very little. Id. In
one example, the authors found that for a mere 1.8% increase in expected cost, there could be a 20.6%
increase in the offer. Id. Even a 10% increase in offer leads to a minuscule .4% increase in the cost.
Id. "The bottom line is that each party... can increase or converge its offer with very little penalty
by way of increased cost." Id. at 244 (emphasis added).
59. See Simon Milner, Dispute Deterrence: Evidence on Final-Offer Arbitration, Centre for
Economic Performance, London School of Economics and Political Science, 1992, available at
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/21053/; see generally Ian McAndrew, Final-Offer Arbitration: New Zealand
Variation, 42 INDUS. RELATIONS 42, (2003); Final Offer Arbitration for the Resolution of Rate and
Service Disputes, CANADIAN TRANSPORTATION AGENCY, available at http://www.cta-otc.gc.ca/
doc.php?sid=l 134&lang=eng (last visited Sept. 25, 2009) (discussing FOA in the Canada
Transportation Act).
60. Major League Baseball will have more than one hundred individual filings annually for the
FOA process. In contrast, the use of FOA in the municipal or state setting generally involves a single
FOA proceeding for all the employees who fall under a specific collective bargaining agreement.
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baseball's preeminent league came to use this process so regularly requires an
understanding of the game's long and contentious labor history. Baseball's
original professional circuit was the National League and it was formally
founded in 1871.61 During the early years, players would sign contracts with
a team for a single season and then have the autonomy to switch clubs if a
better deal was offered the following campaign. 62 But as baseball started to
gain greater stature on the American sporting landscape, owners began to
worry about this annual change in personnel. 63 They were concerned with
two issues. The first was the increasing salaries players were obtaining on the
open market. 64 The second was that team supporters, whose attendance at
games represented each clubs' central source of income, were "becoming
disenchanted with the home team because one or more favorites had been bid
away by another franchise .... 65
To counteract this trend, team owners signed a "National Agreement" on
September 30, 1879, which led to a process that became known as the reserve
system. 66 This labor-controlling mechanism was first adopted in 1880 and
allowed each club to prevent any opposing team from contracting with five
protected players. 67 Owners enjoyed immediate results from this new system
as "salaries decreased, profits increased, and the League operated more
smoothly." 68 As a result, the league's potentates began extending the reserve
system. In 1883, the number of players protected increased to eleven and, in
1887, that total was raised to fourteen.69 Not long after, owners claimed the
rights of all players on the roster, effectively meaning that every player was
tied to their original team for life unless the club chose to sell or trade that
individual to another team. 70 If a club did not want to send a player to another
team, the athlete's only alternative was to quit baseball and find another job.71
In attempts to oppose the system, players formed unions as a way to
collectively bargain for their rights. The first, created in 1885, was the
Hence, the reason FOA is often referred to as baseball arbitration.
61. Chantel D. Carmouche, Arbitration and Major League Baseball, 1 J. AM. ARB. 91, 92
(2001).
62. DWORKIN, supra note 6, at 8-9.
63. Id. at 9.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Carmouche, supra note 61, at 92.
67. DWORKIN, supra note 6, at 10.
68. Carmouche, supra note 61, at 92.
69. DWORKIN, supra note 6, at 10.
70. Carmouche, supra note 61, at 93.
71. DWORKIN, supra note 6, at 10.
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National Brotherhood of Professional Ball Players.7 2 It aimed to address low
wages and the reserve system, but did so with little success. In 1886, star
player John Montgomery Ward leaked information about the group's
intentions to fight the reserve system to the news media. 73 Owners reacted by
threatening to blacklist unionized players. In response, the players attempted
to form their own league, but ultimately failed as most of the athletes were
unwilling to switch leagues after the owners met some player demands - such
as a higher minimum salary - but retained the basic structure of the reserve
sysiem. 74 Similar efforts by players to organize occurred again with the
League Protective Players' Association (1900-1902) 7 5 and the Baseball
Players' Fraternity (1912-1918).76 In both instances, the owners made some
concessions to the players, but did not end the reserve system. 77
Any hope that players had of convincing management to dismantle the
restrictive system was seriously curtailed by the United States Supreme Court
in 1922. In Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of
Professional Baseball Clubs, the United States's highest court held that
established professional baseball was a "purely state affair[ ]," exempting the
league from antitrust law, which required interstate commerce. 78  This
decision implicitly affirmed the teams' right to use the reserve system.79
Despite this ruling, a lawyer named Robert Murphy made yet another effort to
overcome the reserve system when he set up a new players union, the
American Baseball Guild, in 1946.80 He attempted to convince players to
strike rather than suffer through a system that effectively made them
indentured servants. His efforts failed. 8 l Then, less than a decade later, the
72. Id. at 11.
73. Id.
74. DWORKIN, supra note 6, at 12.
75. Id. 12-15.
76. Id. 15-17.
77. Id. at 12-17. In both cases, rival leagues saw the player unrest as an opportunity to compete
against the established National League. In the first instance, the National League combined with the
opposing American League to form a two-league structure that still exists today as the Major
Leagues. In the second situation, a rival Federal League failed.
78. See Fed. Baseball Club of Baltimore v. Nat'l League of Prof'l Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200,
208 (1922).
79. See Carmouche, supra note 61, at 95. The plaintiffs, a nascent Baltimore team from the
fledgling Federal League trying to become an alternative to the Major Leagues, had argued that the
reserve system was part of the Major League's violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act. The Supreme
Court did not support this contention. See Fed. Baseball Club of Baltimore, 259 U.S. at 208.
80. DWORKIN, supra note 6, at 17-20.
81. Id at 17-20. On June 7, 1946, Murphy demanded recognition for his union and collective
bargaining rights, claiming that if the owners did not accede, the Pittsburgh Pirates team would strike.
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United States Supreme Court reinforced the players' labor woes with its 1953
decision Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., which upheld management's right
to enforce a reserve system. 82 Finally, in 1972, the Court decided yet again
not to overturn the owners' monopolistic ability to control player movements
in Flood v. Kuhn.83 According to one critique, the court upheld the systemi
which was artificially depressing salaries by closing off the marketplace to
players, because "too many long-term commitments had been based on the
assumption of baseball's exemption [from antitrust law] to overturn it." 84
B. Introduction ofArbitration
This brief history gives some sense of the enduring worker-management
acrimony in baseball. Nevertheless, the concept of arbitration was long
discussed between the two sides-albeit with labor and management having
very different concepts of what that process truly entailed.
The notion of arbitration in baseball was first suggested in the nineteenth
century, when a council of team owners designated to administer league
policies was referred to as its "board of arbitration." 85 But this board was not
constructed to serve as a neutral. Rather, it was merely management's
representative group. In 1908, a player named Tommy Leach proposed a form
of arbitration more in line with today's notion of the process. 86 To resolve a
salary dispute with his club, the Pittsburgh Pirates, Leach suggested that three
arbitrators from the local community consider the issue. 87 The panel would
include one civic leader chosen by Leach, another picked by the team and a
third selected by the other two arbitrators. 88 Pirates owner Barney Dreyfuss
rejected the proposal and gave Leach an ultimatum: accept the club's offer or
leave baseball. 89 Leach accepted. 90
Id. In the end, the players voted 20-16 to strike, but a two-thirds majority was necessary and so the
strike did not commence. Id. This event crushed Murphy's credibility and the union quickly faded
away.
82. See Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356, 357 (1953). Player George Toolson
argued that the reserve system was a restraint of trade under U.S. federal antitrust law, but the
Supreme Court held that "Congress had no intention of including the business of baseball within the
scope of the federal antitrust laws." Id.
83. See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 284 (1972).
84. STEFAN SZYMANSKI & ANDREW ZIMBALIST, NATIONAL PASTIME: How AMERICANS PLAY
BASEBALL AND THE REST OF THE WORLD PLAYS SOCCER 95 (2005).
85. ROGER I. ABRAMS, THE MONEY PITCH: BASEBALL FREE AGENCY AND SALARY
ARBITRATION 145-46 (2000).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
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The concept of arbitration reemerged in 1952 when, during testimony
before a United States Congressional subcommittee, baseball's commissioner
A.B. "Happy" Chandler endorsed a player's right to request this type of
proceeding in difficult salary disputes. 91 But the owners, who had much
success keeping salary costs down thanks to the reserve system, remained
steadfastly opposed to giving the players any sort of formalized mechanism for
neutrally settling disputes. "This is a very difficult situation for any arbitrator
because... [t]here are lots of things players do to help win games that are not
reflected in averages, and to see and know what [a player] does you must be
there and observe it," argued Charles Feeney, who would serve as the
president of the National League from 1969 to 1986.92 In other words,
baseball's management was not going to engage in the arbitration process
unless it had to do so.
That pressure finally came in the form of Marvin Miller. 93 In 1966,
Miller left his position as chief economist for the United States' third-largest
union, the United Steelworkers of America, to become the executive director
of the Major League Players Association (MLBPA). 94 Although the MLBPA
union was established in 1954, it was not until Miller assumed the
organization's top role that true negotiations commenced between labor and
management. 95  In 1968, he brokered baseball's first basic collective
bargaining agreement. 96 Then, two years later, Miller was able to secure the
use of an impartial arbitrator to settle numerous forms of disputes between
baseball's labor and management. 97 After the players came out on the losing
side of the Flood v. Kuhn decision, Miller believed arbitration would be an
90. Id.
91. James B. Dworkin, Final Offer Salary Arbitration (FOSA) - a.k.a. Franchise Owners' Self
Annihilation, in Stee-Rike Four!: What's Wrong with the Business of Baseball? 73-74, 75 (Daniel R.
Marburger ed., Praeger Publishers, 1997).
92. DWORKIN, supra note 6, at 142.
93. MARVIN MILLER, A WHOLE DIFFERENT BALL GAME: THE INSIDE STORY OF BASEBALL'S
NEW DEAL 239 (1991).
94. Id. at 19-20.
95. GEORGE J. MITCHELL, REPORT TO THE COMMISSIONER OF BASEBALL OF AN INDEPENDENT
INVESTIGATION INTO THE ILLEGAL USE OF STEROIDS AND OTHER PERFORMANCE ENHANCING
SUBSTANCES 31 (2007), available at http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/sports/
mitchell-report_20071213.pdf.
96. Major League Baseball Players' Association: Frequently Asked Questions,
MLBPLAYERS.MLB.CoM, http://mlbplayers.mlb.com/pa/info/faq.jsp#cba (last visited Sept. 23,
2009).
97. MILLER, supra note 93, at 239; ALBERT T. POWERS, THE BUSINESS OF BASEBALL 175
(2003).
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indispensible tool for slowly doing away with the reserve system. 98 "With
impartial arbitration in effect, we could argue the meaning and interpretation
of a contract provision," Miller wrote in his autobiography. 99 "It was only a
matter of time, I felt, before we could test whether a club's right of renewal of
a contract lasted forever."' 100 Indeed, arbitration became a key component in
settling player grievances. But tensions continued to intensify and, in 1972,
Miller was able to mobilize players in a manner previous labor leaders were
unable: he organized a strike.' 0 ' The thirteen-day works stoppage led to a
number of changes, including, most notably, the institution of FOA for salary
disputes. 102
C. Choosing Final-Offer Arbitration
Despite the reluctance of baseball executives like Feeney to implement
salary arbitration, the owners actually first proposed the use of this process in
the negotiations that followed the 1972 strike. 10 3 Quite possibly, the owners
sensed that in order to maintain the reserve system, some form of neutral wage
determination system was necessary. Or, they wanted to engender some
goodwill with labor. The comments of Bill Veeck, an owner at the time,
suggest this second assertion might be accurate. Veeck said:
I think [salary arbitration] would be a splendid idea... I think
that it would create a little better relationship. Just the right to
have an arbitration, the right not to be feeling that you are
singly, as an athlete, negotiating against the wealth of a ball
club, I think it would improve relationships. 104
From the players' perspective, salary arbitration was essential in the quest
for fair wages. "The difference between ballplayers being required to accept
98. MILLER, supra note 93, at 239.
99. Id. at 240.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 203.
102. DWORKIN, supra note 6, at 33, 80. In 1975, Miller's goal to use arbitration to cripple the
reserve system was realized. MILLER, supra note 93, at 241. Miller's MLBPA filed a grievance on
behalf of two players named Andy Messersmith and David McNally, claiming that they should not be
bound to teams in perpetuity. Id. at 244. On December 23, 1975, arbitrator Peter Seitz ruled in favor
of the players. As a result, baseball began a new era of free agency - a process in which players
could accept offers from any team in the marketplace once their current contact expired. Id. at 255.
Yet, even with the advent of free agency, baseball retained the FOA system. Id. at 251-54.
103. Dworkin, supra note 91, at 75.
104. DWORKIN, supra note 6, at 142.
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whatever a club offered him, as had been the case almost from the beginning
of professional baseball, and the new system of salary arbitration was like the
difference between dictatorship and democracy," Miller wrote. 10 5 "Salary
arbitration has been a major factor in eliminating gross inequities in salary
structures from club to club (and sometimes on the same club) .... , 106
But why did the two sides choose FOA rather than conventional
arbitration? The literature is scant with explicit explanations. 107 To be sure,
the decision to use FOA was not taken lightly. The owners offered salary
arbitration to the union on February 8, 1973, but the parties negotiated for
three weeks on the format and structure of the arbitration. 108 Surely, Miller,
who was an expert in the arbitration process, had a strong say in the choice of
FOA. In his autobiography, Miller offered some insight into why he would
opt for FOA over conventional arbitration. A year before labor and
management chose FOA, an arbitrator named Lew Gill came to a compromise
decision in a conventional arbitration case that infuriated Miller. '0 9 "Gill, like
many 'neutral' arbitrators, had a tendency to 'split the baby,' trying, if he
could, to placate both sides," Miller wrote. ' 10 "I carefully cited chapter and
verse on past baby-splitting decisions of his and stated that this time he had
gone too far." I 1  Miller's belief in this common criticism of conventional
arbitration - splitting the difference or "splitting the baby," as Miller described
it - indicates that he would have certainly been open to FOA if not an outright
proponent.
D. Structure of Major League Baseball's Final-Offer Arbitration
Beyond Miller's distaste for midpoint awards, an investigation of the
unique elements of baseball's FOA system suggests that it was unlikely the
only reason for its implementation. The mechanisms of baseball's FOA are
characterized by very narrow and explicit rules for scope, timing, and award
criteria. It is a specially designed system that takes into account the
uniqueness of collective negotiations with athletes and vigorously attempts to
105. MILLER, supra note 93, at 109.
106. Id.
107. DWORKIN, supra note 6, at 145. James B. Dworkin, an expert on the history of Major
League Baseball's salary arbitration, was so devoid of a specific reason that he mustered this
rudimentary justification, "[o]ne simple answer in the baseball arena is that [FOA] is the technique
that the two parties agreed upon." Id.
108. Id. at 143.
109. MILLER, supra note 93, at 139.
110. Id. at 139-40.
111. Id. at 140.
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push parties toward negotiated settlement.
Baseball's form of FOA has been considered "a hybrid" between issue and
package FOA. 112 Each arbitration considers a single issue-a player's salary
amount-but "entails the high degree of risk commonly associated with the
package system" as the single-issue approach prevents an arbitrator from
crafting issue-by-issue compromises. 113 Baseball's basic agreement restricts
the type of award players can seek via FOA to single-year contacts and the
judgments are limited to players' wages."I4 If a player wants to negotiate a
multi-season agreement with benefits beyond simple salary, he will be unable
to do so if he opts for FOA. 115 Therefore, a player cannot use this process to
negotiate such ancillary rights as a no-trade clause,"16 bonuses based on
performance, or additional tickets for family members or special travel
accommodations if he chooses to use this process.1 1 As a result, settlement
serves as the only "means of preserving any number of potential benefits that
may be negotiated outside of arbitration."ll 8 In total, the use of a single issue
allows the parties to keep the process simple and streamlined. 19 This keeps
costs down as neither side must prepare for a wide array of issues. '2 0 At the
same time, the "either-or" decision on the issue of salary maintains FOA's
gambling element, which has proved to encourage settlements. 12'
Baseball's system also differs greatly from the other typical FOA systems
in that, despite the process being set up as part of a collective bargaining
agreement, each player eligible can request his own hearing. In typical FOA
settings in the United States, negotiators will consider salary disputes for the
whole collective bargaining unit in a single hearing. "Workers who face the
same day-to-day working conditions, receive generally the same level of
compensation, and bring to the workplace a similar set of skills and
112. Spencer B. Gordon, Final Offer Arbitration in the New Era of Major League Baseball 13
(Bepress Legal Series, Working Paper No. 1326, 2006), available at http://law.bepress.com/expresso/
eps/1326/.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 12.
115. Id.
116. In professional baseball, teams generally have the right to assign the contract of a player to
another team in return for other personnel, financial compensation, or a combination of the two. This
is done in the form of a "trade." Players can negotiate the right not to be sent to another club without
their express agreement through a "no-trade" clause in their contracts.
117. Gordon, supra note 112, at 12.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 16.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 11.
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experiences would be placed together in the same bargaining unit," wrote
baseball arbitrator Roger Abrams. 122 Abrams continued:
This is a unit a union could represent effectively in bargaining
since its members have similar interests, expectations, and
aspirations. In most collective bargaining settings, a union
tries to maximize the interests of all its members... [a
professional sports] bargaining unit is so diverse in terms of
individual earning potential as to present an impossible
challenge to any labor organization. 123
Thus, despite similar working conditions and hours, each individual player is
allowed to negotiate separately because "[i]n baseball, the potential market
value and resulting salaries of players within the bargaining unit vary
widely." 124
To counterbalance the time-consuming nature of allowing multiple
hearings, baseball's salary arbitration system is generally utilized by only a
select group of young-veteran Major League Baseball players. 125 While a
very small number of older players are offered salary arbitration each year,
very few accept.126 As a result, baseball's arbitration system is mainly geared
toward players with three to less than six years of Major League service time,
along with a select group of players with less than three years but more than
two years of experience. 127 From a logistical standpoint, maintaining a small
122. ABRAMS, supra note 85, at 91.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 90.
125. See generally David J. Faurot & Stephen McAllister, Salary Arbitration and Pre-
Arbitration Negotiation in Major League Baseball, 45 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 697 (1992) (noting
that any player's salary may be decided by FOA if both the player and his club consent to the
procedure, but the process is essentially only used by those in the select class discussed in this
paragraph).
126. Mike Scarr, 24 Players Offered Salary Arbitration, MLB.coM, Dec 12, 2008,
http://mlb.mlb.com/news/article.jspymd=20081202&content -id=3698166&vkey=hotstove20O8&fex
t=.jsp. In 2008, for example, twenty-four older veterans were offered salary arbitration, only two
accepted.
127. See generally 2007-11 MLB BASIC AGREEMENT, available at http://mlbplayers.mlb.com/
pa/pdf/cba-english.pdf. An athlete in what is called the "super two" category becomes eligible if,
"(a) he has accumulated at least 86 days of service during the immediately preceding season; and (b)
he ranks in the top seventeen (17%) (rounded to the nearest whole number) in total service in the class
of Players who have at least two but less than three years of Major League service." Id.; Major
League Baseball Players' Association supra note 86; see generally Faurot, supra note 107, at 698.
Throughout the history of collective bargaining in Major League Baseball, the size of the eligible
FOA group has been a point of negotiation. Initially, all players with more than two seasons of
experience, but less than six, were allowed to partake in baseball's salary arbitration system. But, as
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group of players that use arbitration makes it easier to complete all the
individual hearings in a short period of time (see below for a discussion of
FOA scheduling). From a negotiation perspective, ownership is able to retain
the exclusive services of young experienced players, as athletes in this
arbitration class are prohibited from negotiating with other teams without team
consent, while the players have an opportunity to increase their salaries at a
stage in their career when an otherwise monopolistic system would have
prevented significant pay rises.
In terms of timing, the system is set up to put pressure on the parties to
come to a quick settlement. 128 In most cases, it is the clubs' decision whether
to offer arbitration or instead opt to release a player from its exclusive control,
allowing him to be a free agent and negotiate with any team. 129 Clubs are
required to notify players of their plans to offer arbitration between January 2
and January 15 of the year in which the player's salary is to be determined. 130
Within three days after a notice of submission for arbitration has been made,
the parties must exchange final salary figures. 131 Arbitration hearings are then
set for "as soon as possible after submission and, to the extent practicable...
[between] February 1 and February 20." 132 The short period between the
exchange of figures and potential hearing dates adds a time pressure
component for the parties to settle. Also, as the baseball season runs from
preseason training in late February through a postseason that ends in late
October, the window to conclude all arbitrations is small, in order to assure
that all cases are completed during the offseason. By doing so, it prevents any
distractions in play.
When cases do go to arbitration, they are decided by an arbitration panel
comprised of three neutrals. 133 Contractually, the players and owners are
expected to jointly agree on the list of arbitrators who will be called upon to
hear cases in a given year. 134 In years when the parties cannot agree on a
roster of arbitrators, they request a list of potential candidates from the
American Arbitration Association, and the two sides will alternately strike
part of a strike settlement in 1985, the three-year minimum was established. Since then, the "super
two" group has been added to the class. See generally Faurot, supra note 125, at 698.
128. See Meth, supra note 19, at 392-93.
129. 2007-11 MLB BASIC AGREEMENT, supra note 127, at 16.
130. Id. at 15.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 16-17.
133. Id; see generally Meth, supra note 19, at 400-01. While baseball previously employed a
single arbitrator to hear cases, a three-member panel system was set up in 2000. Id. at 400.
134. Id. at 401.
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names until they settle on appropriate arbitrators. 135  A final pool of
approximately fifteen arbitrators is chosen. 136 Nearly every arbitrator picked
is a member of the National Academy of Arbitrators and most are veterans of
the process. 137
When a case cannot be settled and requires a hearing, the arbitrators are
given a very specific set of six areas to consider when deciding the dispute.
The criteria are:
1.Player's contribution to his Club during the past season
(including but not limited to his overall performance, special
qualities of leadership and public appeal)";
2.the length and consistency of his career contribution";
3.the record of the Player's past compensation";
4.comparative baseball salaries";
5.the existence of any physical or mental defects on the part of
the Player; and
6.the recent performance record of the Club including but not
limited to its League standing and attendance as an indication
of public acceptance. 138
The parties are allowed to proffer any evidence that they deem relevant to
these areas and the arbitrators are instructed when considering salary
comparables to give specific attention to players who have a similar amount of
service experience. 139
In order to narrow further the scope of argument in the arbitration, the
parties are prohibited from providing evidence in a number of additional areas.
The financial position of both the player and the club cannot be considered;
press comments, testimonials or other similar information about the
performance of the team or player are barred; neither offers made by either
party prior to arbitration nor the costs associated with the proceeding can be
disclosed; and parties are not allowed to make salary comparisons between
baseball players and individuals in other occupations such as wages of
135. 2007-11 MLB BASIC AGREEMENT, supra note 127, at 17.
136. Farout, supra note 125, at 700.
137. Roger I. Abrams, It's Time to Play the Baseball Salary Arbitration Game!, HUFFINGTON
POST, Feb. 9, 2009, available at www.huffingtonpost.com/roger-i-abrams/its-time-to-play-the-
base b_163534.html.
138. 2007-11 MLB BASIC AGREEMENT, supra note 127, at 18-19.
139. Id.
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competitors in other sports. 140 Many of these points are in place to keep the
process streamlined. For example, the stipulation that neither party may
introduce media accounts avoids an endless back-and-forth of opposing media
clippings. As one veteran baseball salary arbitrator put it: "[O]nce the
floodgates were opened to press accounts, there would be no stopping
point... [p]ress comments tend to come in matching pairs .... ,,141 As for
preventing the introduction of comparable salaries outside the baseball
profession, "[t]here is no way for baseball salary arbitrators to evaluate what
the performances of these other entertainers contribute to their enterprises,
since the arbitrators face enough of a challenge trying to measure a baseball
player's contribution, especially because the critical permissible factors tend to
point in different directions."1 42 -
With the parameters of the arbitration highly specified, the process occurs
in a very short timeframe. At the hearing, each party receives one hour to
offer its evidence and an additional one-half hour to rebut any opposing
claims. 143 These proceedings are contractually private and confidential. 14 At
the conclusion of the hearing, the arbitrators are given no more than 24 hours
to pick either the player's or the club's offer. 145 The panel is prohibited from
disclosing either any detailed opinion on the case or an explanation on how the
panel members voted. 146 The arbitrators simply provide the parties with a
one-year uniform player's contract that has the winning salary figure
included. 147
In terms of how arbitrators make their decisions in the baseball salary
environment, it has been suggested that they base their decisions on two
factors: the criteria stated in the collective bargaining agreement and the
potential of being removed the following year as an arbitrator if the parties are
displeased with their decisions. 148 This second motivation means arbitrators
attempt "to decide cases in the same manner as other surviving arbitrators
[from previous years] .... 149 The assumption is that beyond making
adjustments for overall salary levels, arbitrators will look to choose a salary
140. Id. at 19.
141. ABRAMS, supra note 85, at 65.
142. Id. at 64.
143. 2007-11 MLB BASIC AGREEMENT, supra note 127, at 17-18 (noting that the arbitrators can
make additional time available if necessary).
144. Id.
145. Id. at 16.
146. Id. at 17.
147. Id.
148. Farout, supra note 125, at 700.
149. Id.
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comparable to those picked previously by surviving arbitrators because those
decisions were presumably palatable to the players and management. 150 Still,
according to experienced arbitrator Roger Abrams, the decision-making is not
calculated on self-preservation. "The arbitration panel ... looks at the final
offer and demand to find the 'break point,' the mid-point between the final
positions[,]" Abrams wrote. 151 "If [the player] is worth more, even by one
dollar, the panel should vote to give him what he demanded. If he is worth
less, again even by one dollar, it should vote for the club's offer."' 5 2 If, in
fact, these decisions were pre-meditated, baseball arbitration panels should
generally decide unanimously on the winner based on past decisions. '5 3 But
Abrams said that the arbitrators "review the glossy briefs the [player's] agent
and club submit [and then] argue among themselves."' 154 All this indicates
that the arbitrators are driven by the first factor: the criteria outlined in the
collective bargaining agreement.
E. Assessing Major League Baseball's Final-Offer Arbitration Structure and
Results
The architecture of baseball's FOA strongly suggests that its designers
focused on negotiated settlement as their number one priority and, if that could
not occur, wanted as speedy a resolution as possible through third-party
determination. In an effort to force mutual agreement, the group of players,
the scope of award (just salary), and the criteria for arbitrator decision-making
were all very limited. As a result, the process is simplified to avoid the
burdensome task of compromising on a litany of issues or contemplating a
vast variety of vague criteria. For the owners, the small group that generally
employs salary arbitration helps prevent management from becoming
overwhelmed by juggling too many cases, again a facet that makes it easier to
focus in on the task of settlement. For the players, settlement is a valuable
inducement because if an eligible athlete wants anything more than a one-year
basic contract, he must negotiate through settlement, as baseball's FOA only
provides for nothing else. For both parties, the fact that players bargain
individually provides a final reason to settle. One baseball FOA writer
explained,
[T]eams prefer to avoid arbitration hearings in which they
150. Id.
151. See generally ABRAMS, supra note 85.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
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may be forced to defend their proposals by insulting players
and presenting arguments that emphasize a player's mental
and physical shortcomings, limited contributions to the team
in the past, club record since being a member of the team, or
less than ideal public appeal ... .155
In instances where negotiated settlement cannot be reached, the format also
appears to have been set up to assure quick resolution. 156 The period between
the exchange of offers and final determination is usually less than a month and
the time period between a hearing and an award announcement is no longer
than twenty-four hours. 157
Why would baseball's FOA creators want to emphasize these outcomes?
Clearly, more time could be spent on assuring that final awards are as accurate
as possible based on a broader range of criteria. But baseball's system is
constructed in a manner that identifies the uniqueness of salary negotiation in
high-profile professional sports. This is evident in the decision to allow each
athlete to file for arbitration individually, rather than as a group. 158 While no
workers want to believe they are just a replaceable cog in a wheel, the
individual right to bargain in baseball reflects how each player lacks a fungible
quality. More than that, the pressure to settle and the speed with which
arbitrations are resolved when settlement cannot be achieved, offers an
inherent sports-related advantage to both labor and management. 15 9 Baseball
players do not have long careers as the average Major League athlete lasts just
5.6 seasons. 160 In other professions careers may last decades, meaning that a
long protracted negotiation might be worth the time lost plying one's trade.
This generally will not be the case with players, who have a small window of
fitness, youth, and heightened skill levels. As a result, the ability to resolve
disputes quickly is valuable for the men on the field. For owners, shortening
the process into the brief baseball offseason, between November and mid-
February, protects teams from having to embark on a season without its
complete roster of players. 161 Before salary arbitration, players would refuse
to report to pre-season practice sessions in an effort to force a pay increase.
155. Gordon, supra note 112, at 12.
156. Id. at 17.
157. Id. at 15.
158. Seeid. at 14.
159. Id. at 16.
160. Average Major League Baseball Career 5.6 Years, Says New Study, SCIENCEDAILY.COM,
July 11, 2007, http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2007/070709131254.htm.
161. Gordon, supra note 112, at 16
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This is not the case anymore. As one academic explains:
[i]n the context of its dispute resolution capacity, Final Offer
Arbitration has proven to be a successful addition in Major
League Baseball by establishing job-security for players,
ensuring clubs are fully stocked with players under contract,
providing monetary incentive for high player performance,
and saving an incalculable amount of money by isolating and
controlling grievances. 162
If the primary unstated goal of baseball arbitration's creators has been to
effectuate negotiated settlement, then they have succeeded mightily.
According to one study of the first 23 years of baseball salary arbitration
(1974-1996), 2,008 players filed for salary arbitration with 1,608 (80%)
settling without the necessity of a hearing. 163  This trend appears to be
increasing in recent years. For example, in 2009, 111 players filed for salary
arbitration. Of that group, sixty-five settled before exchanging offers, and just
three players needed an arbitration hearing to resolve their dispute. 164 In other
words, more than ninety-seven percent of those who filed resolved their
differences through negotiated settlement. "[G]ood faith negotiation does
appear to occur" in baseball's arbitration process, one writer concluded, "what
the figures seem to indicate is that final offer salary arbitration is encouraging
parties to bargain in good faith and reach mutually acceptable settlements prior
to the use of an outside arbitrator. In this regard, final offer arbitration has
achieved its primary goal.' 65
Even if baseball arbitration achieves its intended purpose, there are still
critics of the process. The strongest voice of protest comes from ownership.
Between 1974 and 2009, owners have won fifty-seven percent of all cases that
have gone to a hearing. 166 In fact, between 1997 and 2009, the players have
only succeeded in more cases than the owners in a given year once. 167 So
why does management grumble? "[T]he owners argue that the actual win-loss
record of arbitration hearings is misleading because players are essentially in a
162. Id. at 16-17.
163. Jonathan M. Conti, The Effect of Salary Arbitration on Major League Baseball, 5 SPORTS
LAW. J. 221, 232 (1998).
164. Maury Brown, MLB Salary Arbitration Vital Stats, BIZOFBASEBALL.cOM, Feb. 20, 2009,
http://bizofbaseball.com/index.php?option=com-content&view-artice&id=2974:2009-mlb-salary-
arbitration-vital-stats&catid=66:free-agency-and-trades&Itemid= 153.
165. Conti, supra note 163, at 270-7 1.
166. Brown, supra note 164.
167. Id.
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win-win situation," according to one study. 168 "A vast majority of arbitration-
eligible players who file, not just those who follow through with a hearing, see
significant increases in their salaries." 169 Indeed, the average increase in year-
over-year salary for the 111 players who filed for arbitration in 2009 was
143%.170 This rate of increase is not a new phenomenon. Between 1976 and
1996, the average arbitration awards skyrocketed from $68,000 to $2,300,000,
representing a compound growth rate of twenty-three percent. 171 Even when a
player loses his salary arbitration hearing it is incredibly rare to see a wage
reduction from the previous year. Between 1974 and 1993, out of nearly
2,000 arbitration filings, there were only nine instances in which a player
suffered a drop in his salary from the previous season. 172
Still, this argument must be seen through the prism of baseball's labor
history and the timing in which players are generally eligible for FOA. In the
period before collective bargaining and FOA, player salaries were widely
described as being "artificially low" as a result of "owners having the luxury
of being the only employer able to negotiate with [the] player." 173 Under the
FOA system, players and owners can now negotiate on equal footing, which
presumably leads to wage figures that are, at the least, closer to fair market
value. 174 In addition, players become eligible for FOA after approximately
three seasons of Major League experience. 175  During those first three
campaigns, most players start at a minimum wage and receive only small
increases. 176 For example, pitcher Jonathan Papelbon received approximately
$1.5 million total in his first three seasons with the Boston Red Sox (an
average of $500,000 per year). 177 During each of those seasons (2006-2008),
Papelbon was named an "All-Star," which is a designation given to the sport's
very best players. Yet, during that period, Papelbon's salary never came close
to the league average, which ranged from $2.87 million to $3.15 million. 178
When the pitcher finally became eligible for FOA in 2008, his team was
168. Conti, supra note 163, at 235.
169. Gordon, supra note 112, at 271.
170. Brown, supra note 164.
171. ROSNER, supra note 45, at 271.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. See id. at 272.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Jonathan Papelbon Statistics and History, BASEBALL-REFERENCE.COM, http:/]
www.baseball-reference.com/players/p/papeljo01 .shtml (last visited Sept. 25, 2009).
178. MLB Salaries, CBSSPORTS.CoM, http://www.cbssports.com/mlb/salaries/avgsalaries (last
visited Sept. 25, 2009).
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forced to deal on equal footing. As a result, the two sides agreed on a $6.25
million contract for Papelbon for the 2009 season, an 806% raise over the
previous year.179 In other words, FOA often increases salaries to put them in
line with other players who possess bargaining leverage. Also to the extent
that salaries do increase through this system, it is contained to a relatively
small percentage of baseball's overall playing population. Only twenty-five
percent of players use the arbitration process. 180 Finally, there is nothing to
suggest that the final-offer format (as opposed to conventional arbitration)
specifically spurs higher salaries. Under conventional arbitration similar
increases could be experienced, but one of the primary values of the FOA
system-a speedy resolution usually through negotiated settlement-might not
occur.
An extension of the burgeoning salary critique is that escalating wages
place "small-market" teams at a disadvantage. 18 1 Proponents of this claim
assert that "large-market" clubs spend excessively on free agent players and
that arbitration salaries are "determined in part by the free agent salaries that
large-market teams have paid for comparable players."' 182 Since arbitration
criteria prevents teams from introducing evidence about their financial
situation, small-market franchises cannot use explanations of limited cash flow
to explain why they should not have to match the salaries large-market teams,
which can over-step market value because of additional revenue.
"Consequently, Final Offer Arbitration consistently imposes on poorer
franchises an economic loss by forcing these small-market clubs to sign
players for salaries exceeding these players' value to the team," the argument
concluded. 183
Still, this problem is mitigated to some extent by the fact that arbitrators
are directed to focus on using players with similar service time as
comparisons. 184 Players in the three- to under-six-year time frame are the
179. Adam Kilgore, Nothing Arbitrary About Papelbon's Deal: Reliever, Sox Settle for a Record
$6.25m, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 21, 2009, available at, http://www.boston.com/sports/baseball/
redsox/articles/2009/01/2 1/nothing-arbitraryaboutpapelbons deal/.
180. Gordon, supra note 112, at 19.
181. Vittorio Vella, Swing and a Foul Tip: What Major League Baseball Needs to do to Keep its
Small Market Franchises Alive at the Arbitration Plate, 16 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 317,
318 (2006). "Small-market" teams are those in cities or regions where revenue streams from such
outlets as television licensing, advertising sales and merchandising are not as readily abundant as
those available in "large-market" cities such as New York and Los Angeles. Id.
182. Id. at 328.
183. Id.
184. 2007-11 MLB BASIC AGREEMENT, supra note 127, at 18. The arbitrators are directed to
"give particular attention, for comparative salary purposes, to the contracts of Players with Major
League service not exceeding one annual service group above the Player's annual service group." Id.
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main models for comparison and athletes in that service time category would
not be eligible for the big contracts offered by large-market teams through free
agency. This limits the degree to which free agents should be considered as
direct comparables. In addition, these small market teams are not bound to
offer arbitration. A small market club fearful of a huge increase - the likes
enjoyed by Jonathan Papelbon - could trade the athlete's rights to another
team or the organization could simply decline to offer a contract, releasing the
player from his obligation to the club. As for allowing sides to proffer
evidence on the financial wherewithal of a club, it would certainly .undermine
the speedy nature of the arbitration process, which is a cornerstone reason for
FOA. As one baseball expert put it the process of club valuation is "extremely
complex and technical."1 85 Arbitrators could weigh both sides of arguments
on the financial positions of teams, but it would be a time-consuming process.
Finally, the debate over convergence and divergence that exists in FOA
offers in the United States' public sector occurs in the baseball world as
well. 186 As is the case outside of the baseball realm, academics have not come
to a definitive conclusion as to whether FOA creates a convergence or
divergence of offers. 187 Some have even argued that the process does not lead
to either phenomenon occurring. "What one can surmise from the plethora [of
data] . . . is that although the players' demands and the clubs' offers are not
remarkably close, they are also not extremely divergent," concluded one
study. 188 "One does not see a consistent effort on the part of the players to
massively inflate their demands, nor is there a consistent level of low ball
offers from the clubs."'189 Regardless, with baseball's very high settlement
rate, the divergence or convergence of offers is usually only important as a
starting point for negotiation. 190 Only on rare occasions-just three percent of
the time in 2009-does it play a direct role in directly determining a salary
It should be noted that some players in the arbitration pool preemptively sign long-term contracts
beyond their sixth season, offering another element of comparison.
185. John Beamer, Measuring and Managing the Value of Ballclubs (Part One), THE HARD
BALL TIMES, Feb. 19, 2007, available at, http://www.hardballtimes.com/main/article/measuring-
managing-the-value-of-ballclubs-part-1/.
186. Olson, supra note 45, at 38.
187. See generally John B. LaRocco, Reforming Salary Arbitration, in Arbitration 1994,
Controversy and Continuity: Proceedings of the 47th Annual Meeting, National Academy of
Arbitrators 213-14 (Gladys W. Gruenberg ed., 1994) (arguing that FOA has led to divergence); John
L. Fizel, Play Ball: Baseball Arbitration After 20 Years, 49 DisP. RESOL. J. 43 (1994) (showing that
baseball's FOA has not led to divergence).
188. Conti, supra note 163, at 234.
189. Id.
190. See id.
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through an arbitration award. ' 9 '
F. Summary (Part II)
In 1974, baseball instituted FOA as a mechanism to help end years of
bargaining disparity and intense acrimony between labor and management.
Though no explicit explanation was given for the choice of the FOA format,
an analysis of the architecture of the system indicates that the parties were
searching for a structure that would strongly encourage negotiated settlement
and, regardless of the form of resolution (settlement or an arbitration award),
would lead to a quick conclusion of all disagreements. While there have been
criticisms that the process has led to vast wage increases, FOA has
successfully resulted in a high rate of settlement and has assured that all salary
disputes are settled during the small window of time between the end of one
season and the start of the next campaign.
IV. EUROPEAN FOOTBALL AND ITS POTENTIAL USE OF FINAL-OFFER
ARBITRATION
A. Early Labor History
Many cultures around the world can point to antiquity when discussing the
roots of football, but England was the first in the modem era to organize the
game as a sport. That country's Football Association (FA) was founded in
1863 and, under its code, Englishmen spread football throughout Europe.1
92
As an early adopter of formalized play, England was also at the forefront of
professionalizing the sport. In 1885, players began officially receiving wages
for competition. 193 The salaries were meager with participants earning no
more than ten schillings (approximately $2.50) per contest, which could mean
a full season's salary of $75.194
With money at stake-clubs were also charging the public for the right to
watch contests-came increasing concerns about maintaining a competitive
balance. The main fear among organizers was that "[i]f the small teams
simply could not match the crowds of the big ones (the clubs argued) the big
teams would dominate the competition as a consequence of being able to pay
the highest salaries. ." 195 Worried that a talent disparity could cause
191. See Brown, supra note 164.
192. SZYMANSKI, supra note 84, at 50-55.
193. Id. at 101.
194. Id. at 101-02.
195. David McArdle, One Hundred Years of Servitude: Contractual Conflict in English
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spectators to lose interest in the nascent sport, officials placed restrictions on
the ability of richer clubs to lure top talent from smaller teams.196 A retain-
and-transfer system was instituted for the 1893-94 season. This system
required a player "to be registered with the club he intended playing for and
once he registered, he could play for no other club" unless his original team
consented to the transfer of the athlete. 197  In 1895, the first recognized
payment, known as a transfer fee, was paid by one club to another in order to
secure the rights of a retained athlete. 198 Five years later, owners added to this
restrictive system by applying a maximum wage for players. As one observer
noted: "[the] maximum never went far above the earnings of a skilled manual
laborer." 199
As other European countries began to professionalize their domestic
football leagues this retain-and-transfer system was generally mirrored. 200 For
example, when English players began going to continental Europe looking for
work, England's governing body secured an international agreement barring
the transfer of athletes from one country to another without the permission of
the association of the country where the departing player competed. "In
practice... this permission was granted as long as the affected club was
content with the terms of the [transfer] deal." 20 1 In other words, retain-and-
transfer became an international system. While deals could be more lucrative
on the continent, this system kept salaries down throughout Europe. For
instance, an Argentine player named Raimundo Orsi received a contract for
approximately $5,000 (plus a car) in 1928 to play for the Italian club
Juventus. 202  Despite being a superstar, Orsi's salary was very little in
comparison to Major League Baseball's most famous player of the era, George
Herman (Babe) Ruth, who received $70,000 that same year. 20 3
Beginning in the early part of the twentieth century, players pressed the
Professional Football Before Bosman, 2 WEB J. CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES, 2000, available at
http://webjcli.ncl.ac.uk/2000/issue2/mcardle2.html#Heading8.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. SZYMANSKI, supra note 84, at 102.
199. Id. at 101.
200. Id. at 105. Most of Europe's biggest football play nations went to a professional format
between 1925 and 1963. Some examples: Czechoslovakia (1925), Italy (1926), Spain (1929), France
(1932), Netherlands (1954), and Germany (1963).
201. Id. at 106.
202. Id. at 105.
203. Id. at 99-101. Matters were even worse in England where Dixie Dean, who was one of that
country's top players, was earning just $2000 in 1935.
[Vol. 20:1
PLA Y BALL?
courts to dismantle the retain-and-transfer process. 204 The first court case,
involved a player named Lawrence Kingaby in 1912.205 Kingaby had been
sold through the transfer system from Clapton Orient to Aston Villa in
England. 20 6 Kingaby did not meet Aston Villa's expectations and the team
wanted to sell the player back to his original club. When Clapton refused and
Villa could not find another buyer, Kingaby sought out another team. He
played for a couple of clubs before signing with the Croydon Common
Football Club. No transfer fee was paid by the tiny team just south of London.
At this point Villa claimed that a payment was required in order for Kingaby
to play. The court upheld Aston Villa's right to a transfer fee, in large part,
because Kingaby's lawyers incorrectly argued the case. "Kingaby's lawyer
made the mistake of attacking Aston Villa's motives rather than the inequity
of the retain-and-transfer system as a whole. When the judge decided that
there was no proof that Aston Villa had acted maliciously, the case was
dismissed, without any consideration of the fairness of the system."
20 7
Change to the system did not begin to take hold until a half-century after
Kingaby. In England's 1963 high court decision Eastham v. Newcastle United
FC, Justice Wilberforce ruled that the ability for clubs to retain the exclusive
rights to a player after his contract had expired was illegal.20 8 Wilberforce
wrote in his opinion: "Any system that interfered with the player's freedom to
seek other employment at a time when he was not actually being employed by
another club would seem to me to operate substantially in restraint of
trade." 20 9 As a result, "the club holding the player's registration had to offer a
new contract at least as rewarding and of the same duration as the expired
contract ... in order to retain his registration."2 10 But this ruling was limited
in its impact as Wilberforce's decision only focused on the impropriety of the
retain portion of the system, leaving the transfer elements in tact. 211 Players
could now claim to be a free agent if a contract expired, but teams retained the
right to receive a transfer fee even if an athlete was out-of-contract with a
club. 2
12
204. Id. at 103.
205. Id. at 103-104.
206. Id. at 103.
207. Id. at 104.
208. Id. at 111.
209. Eastham v. Newcastle United FC, [1964] Ch. 139, 147.
210. STEPHEN DOBSON & JOHN GODDARD THE ECONOMICS OF FOOTBALL 92 (2001).
211. SZYMANSKI, supra note 84, at 112
212. Id.
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B. European Football's Modern Salary System
In the years following the Eastham decision, the transfer system grew at
an exponential rate. "By the 1960s, the amount of money a club could
generate from selling a star player was substantial enough to make a difference
to the financial future of a club," wrote one observer. 213 In 1960, the transfer
fee record was $290,000; a decade later that number was $590,000. But under
the surface, changes in the law indicated that the system could not continue
unabated. The 1957 Treaty of Rome, which established the European
Economic Community (EEC), enshrined into law the right to "freedom of
movement" for Europeans to work throughout the European Union. 214 The
Union of European Football Associations (UEFA), which was established in
1954 as football's governing body in Europe, initially ignored this requirement
and allowed for teams to effectively veto a player's movement if the clubs
were unhappy with the transfer fee. 215 In 1988, then-UEFA President Jacque
George claimed that "[UEFA] can make up whatever rules we want as long as
they are within Swiss laws, as we have nothing to do with the EEC. '216
This sentiment was proved incorrect when a journeyman Belgian football
player named Jean-Marc Bosman challenged the transfer system in the
European court system. Bosman, whose contract with the Belgian club RFC
Liege had expired, argued that his European rights allowed him to be
transferred to the French team Dunkerque Liege without the new club being
required to pay a transfer fee. The European Court of Justice found in favor of
Bosman, ruling that transfer fees for out-of-contract players were illegal and
that quota systems that limited the number of foreign European Union players
in country's domestic leagues were prohibited. 217 Following the decision, the
European Commission negotiated with UEFA and the Federation
Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), which is international football's
governing body, on a mutually acceptable transfer system. The 2001 pact
allowed teams "to require a transfer fee for players up until the age of 23, as a
reflection of any investment in a player's development." 218  Beyond that
213. Id.
214. Originally this right was delineated in Article 48 of the Treaty, it is now Article 39 of the
EU Treaty. See G. Pearson, The Bosman Case, EU Law and The Transfer System, FOOTBALL
INDUSTRY GROUP, available at http://www.liv.ac.uk/footballindustry/bosman.html.
215. In addition, national football federations were allowed to limit the number of foreigners
permitted to play in their league.
216. McArdle, supra note 195.
217. See Belgian Football Association v. Bosman, 1996 E.C.R. 1-4921, 46; McArdle, supra
note 195.
218. SZYMANSKI, supra note 84, at 114.
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protected period, teams could only receive a transfer fee for players who were
in-contract. As a result, the Bosman ruling gave free agent footballers
unfettered movement.
The scope of Bosman was expanded in 2008 by the Court of Arbitration
for Sport (CAS) in its decision Heart of Midlothian v. Webster and Wigan
Athletic.2 19 Player Andy Webster had one year remaining on his contract with
the Scottish team Heart of Midlothian. 220 When the player and club could not
come to terms on a new deal, Webster unilaterally terminated the final year of
his pact. The court ruled this was permissible, but required Webster to pay
damages equivalent to the amount left on the player's contract. 22 1 The upshot
of this decision was football players (with the exception of 23-and-under
players) could now leave a team while still in contract without transfer fees as
long as they are willing to compensate their club for damages equal to the
value of the time remaining on the contract.
The combination of the Bosman and Webster decisions gives players
tremendous freedom in determining their future. If a football player is out-of-
contract, he can change teams at only the cost of his salary. If the athlete is in-
contract, he may still side-step the transfer fee and depart if he is willing to
pay out what is left on his contract. Only players in the protected period (23-
and-under) are limited. Despite these changes, there is no early indication that
the transfer system is in peril. To date, the Webster decision has not become a
mechanism for players looking to switch teams and players continue to work
within the transfer system.
C. European Football and Arbitration
Arbitration is not a new concept to European football. UEFA and
affiliated clubs have long relied on conventional arbitration on issues ranging
from deciding whether a non-independent state could be prevented
membership to UEFA to tackling conflicts of interest in European club
competitions when two clubs have the same ownership. 222 This commitment
to arbitration was enshrined in a 2007 Memorandum of Understanding
between UEFA and FIFPro (Division Europe), which is the representative
organization for professional football players in Europe. The two parties
agreed to be "supportive of the implementation of proper arbitration
219. Heart of Midlothian PLC v. Webster, CAS 2007/A/1300, 10.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 15l.
222. See The Gibraltar Football Association (GFA) v. Union des Associations Europ6ennes de
Football (UEFA), CAS 2002/0/410, 68; AEK Athens and SK Slavia Prague v. Union of European
Football Associations (UEFA), CAS 98/200, 38.
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procedures to deal with disputes in [football]. '223
In terms of the transfer market and wage disputes, labor and management
have expressed a similar affinity for arbitral resolution. "Subject to national
legislation any dispute between the Club and the Player regarding employment
contract shall be submitted to independent and impartial arbitration composed
of equal representatives of each party (employer and employee) under
National Association statutes, or to CAS."' 224 Moreover, since 2002, FIFA has
used CAS as the body to decide all final appeals on the calculation of player
transfer fees. 225
A notable example of the domestic use of arbitration in the labor market is
the Football League Appeals Committee (FLAG), which addresses transfer
disputes in England under certain circumstances. At the start of the 1977-78
season, English football began allowing out-of-contract players to negotiate a
switch to a new club. 22 6 This move could be done with one restrictive caveat:
if the player's former club offered the footballer a contract at a wage rate that
was as good as or better than the final year of the athlete's deal and those
terms were rejected by the player then the former club was entitled to a fee. 227
If the two teams could not agree on a fee then the FLAC would arbitrate as an
independent tribunal. Its awards focus solely on financial remuneration and
can "take a variety of forms including a topping up payment triggered by a
certain number of appearances with the new club, or the imposition of a share
in the profits made in any subsequent transfer, as well as a straightforward
fee." 228 Following the Bosman decision, the scope of the FLAC has been
narrowed. Since then, the former clubs of out-of-contract players are not
eligible for compensation with one exception: those football players who
remain in the protected 23-years-old-and-under category. In those situations,
the FLAC serves as an arbitration panel for teams unable to agree on a
compensation amount.229
223. See Memorandum of Understanding between the Union des Associations Europeenes de
Football (UEFA) and the Federation Internacionale des Associations de Footballeurs Professionnels
(FIFPro), 3 RIVISTA Di DIRITro ED ECONOMIA DELLO SPORT 157, 160-166 (2007), available at
http://www.rdes.it/RDES-3-07 FIFAFIFPRO.pdf.
224. Id. at 165.
225. F6d~ration Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), FIFA Statutes, art. 60, § 4 (2008),
available at http://www.fifa.com/mm/document/affederation/administration/01/09/75/14/
fifastatutes_072008_en.pdf.
226. F. Carmichael & D. Thomas, Bargaining in the Transfer Market: Theory and Evidence, 25
APPLIED ECON. 1467, 1468 (1993).
227. Id. Although it was instituted more than a decade after the Eastham decision, this system
appears to be put in place to adhere to that ruling.
228. Id.
229. See Rex Garton, Paul Hayes Appeals Hearting Report, SCUNTHORPE-UNITED.CO.UK,
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While this decision-making process uses conventional arbitration rules,
the procedural elements utilized by the FLAC board have a number of
similarities to Major League Baseball's FOA system. The criteria are
streamlined. Payments in these instances are not a "transfer fee" per se, but
represent an amount of compensation for the training and development by the
former team. As a result,
the decision of the Appeals Committee in cases like this is not
in any way based upon the value or the amount that a club
might expect to receive for a player as a 'transfer fee' and
hence, the Committee makes it clear that, in arriving at its
decision, it will not take into account transfer fees that have
been agreed for comparable players between clubs in a free
trade situation.
2 30
What is considered is clearly delineated, including: the costs of developing the
player through its academy or centre of excellence, the length of time with the
former club, the performance of the player, the length of contract offered to
the player by the former club and the extent of interest in the athlete by other
teams. 231 As in baseball, hearings are very short. In the case of player Paul
Hayes, whose fee for moving from Scunthorpe United to Barnsley was set by
the FLAC in 2005, the proceedings and deliberations lasted just two hours
combined. 232 The player met privately with the board first - a procedure that
differs from Major League Baseball, which has the player present throughout
- then each side was given a chance to present its case with the first presenter
being given a brief rebuttal period.233 One key difference with this process is
that partisans are chosen to comprise the board. Unlike baseball's FOA where
arbitrators are mutually agreed upon independents, the FLAC's four-person
arbitration panels have a chairman and then nominees of the Institute of
Football Management and Administration, the Professional Footballers'
Association and the Football League. Regardless, the FLAC arbitration
proceedings' similarities to baseball's FOA offer an instructive example of
how in at least one location European football has embraced speedy and
streamlining characteristics similar to baseball's process.
http://www.scunthorpe-united.co.uk/page/Announcements/0,, 10442-709811,00.html#continue (last
visited Oct. 17, 2009).
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id.
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D. Applying Final-Offer Arbitration to European Football Wage and Transfer
Disputes
The FLAC system is a valuable one in the context of this Article as it is
one of the only - if not the only - European football arbitration system that
actually contemplated the use of FOA in its proceedings. In 1987, FLAC
chairman Sir John Wood instituted an experiment to see whether FOA could
improve his committee's system.234 He did this because, increasingly, parties
were relying on arbitration rather than negotiated settlement to resolve
disputes. In 1986, thirty-three of the forty-three cases of out-of-contract
transfers ended up in arbitration - up from just eight of forty instances in
1978.23 "The factual evidence before the FLAC showed in some cases little
serious attempt at negotiation," Wood wrote. 236 As a result, in a "random
number" of cases in 1987, the parties were asked to submit their formal offers
and then submit what their offer would be under a FOA system. 237 The
results of Wood's experiment showed that FOA "undoubtedly brings the
figures much closer together." 238 Despite this conclusion, Wood said that
gaps between offers "still remained substantial" and that differing of opinions
on the players "would prevent the clubs, however reasonably they acted,
[from] agreeing .... [a] club in a lower Division with a young 'starlet' is
bound to value higher than the senior club taking a player who to them must
be a real risk. ...-239
As this was just an experiment, it is impossible to know how many cases
that went to an arbitration hearing would have been solved through negotiated
settlement if the final offer bids were used and the potential of "either-or" was
applied. Still, the results of Wood's test indicate that a FOA system could
have had value. Furthermore, his concerns seem unfounded in light of what
we know about the baseball system. Baseball owner and player acrimony is
well-detailed, yet they have learned to bargain in good faith. To the extent
that there cannot be an honest meeting of the minds, as Wood suggested, this
may be a product of the criteria for arbitration. While the characteristics
considered are detailed, it is possible that further fine-tuning could lead to an
even greater gap closing between the two sides. One study of FLAC's awards
from 1978-79 to 1990-91 found that selling teams tend to fare poorly in
234. Sir John Wood, Pendulum Arbitration: A Modest Experiment, 19 INDUS REL. J. 244, 245
(1988).
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id. at. 246.
238. Id.
239. Id.
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arbitrated decisions compared to buying clubs. 240 This could very well
indicate that the panel's criteria for awards do not adequately insure
bargaining on a level playing field. With some changes, FLAC might be an
excellent candidate today for the use of FOA as a method for settlement. The
similarities in many of its mechanisms to baseball's arbitration process suggest
that FLAC could also enjoy similar results in the number of negotiated
settlements with the addition of the "either-or" element to its arbitral decision-
making.
Beyond the FLAC system, could FOA have broader reach in the European
football system? There would certainly be hurdles to any prospective
European FOA football system. The first might be cultural. FOA has not been
particularly embraced in Europe's civil law nations. "[L]awyers from civil
law countries tend to be more conservative when selecting their method of
dispute resolution[;]" one observer wrote, "[t]he element of 'gambling' or
'betting' inherent to baseball arbitration may also have contributed to its slow
reception in a more conservative legal environment. ' 241 In addition, in order
to apply FOA on a pan-European basis, it would likely require a collective
bargaining agreement between management and the players similar to the pact
in baseball. Such an agreement is unlikely, according to academic Chuck Korr
who has written on both baseball's labor issues and European football. "The
legal stumbling block for applying U.S. regulations is the nature of football
and its unions," Korr said in an interview. 242 "The sport goes across national
boundaries and has the regulations of the EU to govern it. The union has a
multiplicity of divisions, as well as numerous countries. Trying to craft any
kind of agreement is all the more difficult." Indeed, UEFA and FIFPro
claimed in their memo of understanding in 2007 that "in certain [European]
countries arbitration on labour disputes is not allowed.
243
Despite these limitations, FOA could still have value as an ad hoc tool or a
domestic mechanism in the large majority of European countries that use
arbitration. As the FLAC example indicated, FOA could be utilized in the
transfer process. If the FLAC fine-tuned its criteria, added the FOA
component and went to an independent panel of arbitrators it might serve as a
model for such a system. One reason for this is that the nature of European
240. Alan Speight & Dennis Thomas, Football League Transfers: A Comparison of Negotiated
Fees with Arbitration Settlements, 4 APPLIED ECON. LETTERS 41, 41-44 (1997).
241. Christian Borris, Final Offer Arbitration from a Civil Law Perspective: How to Play
Baseball in Soccer Country, 24 J. INT'L ARB. 307, 307 (2007).
242. Korr has written such books as THE END OF BASEBALL As WE KNEW IT: THE PLAYERS
UNION (1960-198 1) and WEST HAM UNITED: THE MAKING OF A FOOTBALL CLUB (1987). Interview
with Chuck Korr, Professor Emeritus of History, University of Missouri - St. Louis (Jan. 11, 2009).
243. Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 223, at 165.
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football transfer windows lends themselves well to the implementation of
baseball's FOA. Under the current system, transfers in Europe must be
completely conducted during two small windows: winter (generally January 1 St
through February 2nd) and off-season (July 1st through August 31st).2 44 In
order for a transfer to be successfully processed all elements of the deal -
including the transfer fee and the negotiation of the player's salary with his
new club - must be completed. 245 During every window there are stories of
deals falling apart for one of three reasons: (1) although the player and team
could agree on a salary, a transfer fee price could not be settled; (2) the
transfer fee sum is set, but the player and new club cannot come to terms on
wages; and (3) neither wages nor a transfer fee can be agreed upon. In all
these situations, the short timeframe for the window puts pressure on the
process.
In instances where deals are close (i.e. reasons one or two above), parties
could submit to baseball's version of FOA as a method to resolve final
differences. Baseball's FOA has proven successful in effectuating negotiated
settlement at an extremely high rate and doing so in a very short timeframe.
European football's transfer windows offer a similar timeframe for resolution.
In order for such a process to work, it would require the parties to be
committed to resolution. The parties would have to submit to FOA as a
binding decision - hence the need for both sides to be sure that this was a
transaction they wanted. For players in particular, this process may be an
appealing option. For a football player who is very keen to switch clubs, he
may be more willing to take the chance on his wages. Moreover, like baseball
players, footballers recognize that their careers are short and may be willing to
gamble financially to join a new more promising club - especially if there is
ill-will with a player's previous team. Clubs may balk, but if the type of
convergence illustrated in the FLAC study occurs and parties bargain in good
faith, this may be a viable tool under certain circumstances. 246
244. Matt Majendie, The Transfer Window Explained, BBC SPORTS ONLINE, Dec. 18, 2002,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/sportl/hi/footbal12563385.stm. These dates represent the windows for the vast
majority of major European football playing nations; some Nordic countries have slightly different
dates.
245. Id. Note that the FLAC situation discussed earlier is slightly different as the fees were not
considered "transfer fees" but compensation for the investment the former club put into a player. As
a result, they do not have to be concluded during the tight transfer window.
246. In terms of player salaries one important element that would differ in European football
from baseball FOA is that baseball players all sign one-year contracts in the FOA system. It is
customary for players in the European football world to sign multiple year deals. The length of the
contract would likely have to be agreed on before submitting the wage figure to arbitration. In
addition, criteria would probably need to be set by UEFA and FIFPro so as to offer some sense
beforehand of the elements that would be considered by an arbitration panel. Otherwise, the task of
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E. Summary (Part III)
Like baseball, European football has its own history of owner-labor strife.
In recent years, players have earned a tremendous amount of freedom of
movement in the marketplace. Nevertheless, a transfer system, in which teams
can sell players under contract, remains in place. While a comprehensive FOA
apparatus like the one used in baseball is unlikely in European football, the use
of FOA is possible. As one study of the FLAC system indicated, FOA could
be used to bring negotiating terms closer together. FOA could certainly be
used today by the FLAC. In the context of the transfer system, FOA could
also be a valuable tool when parties have settled most financial issues but are
stuck on one element - whether it is a transfer fee figure or a wage sum. As
applied in baseball, its successful application under a tight deadline would
prove useful during football's transfer windows.
V. CONCLUSION
FOA is not for everybody. It requires good faith bargaining and a
willingness to truly commit to negotiated settlement. In baseball, its use has
had its detractors. In particular, the owners believe that arbitration inflates
player salaries. Others counter that it compensates players who have been
underpaid under the final vestiges of the reserve system. Whichever
perspective is correct, it is clear that FOA has been a useful mechanism for
getting teams and players to agree on salaries and to do so under a tight
timeframe.
Could European football benefit from those advantages? The answer is
probably yes. A common term used by the media during the transfer window
is that a deal fell through - despite a transfer fee being agreed on - because the
player "failed to agree personal terms." 247  Surely, the use of FOA would
prevent a good number of those instances. While the use of FOA would
require a cultural shift for many, the influx of American ideas into Europe's
most lucrative league, the English Premiership, in recent years may prove a
harbinger that this kind of change is possible. After all, few would have
thought a generation ago that Americans would serve as key owners for such
detailing the rules for judgment would undermine the speedy nature of the process.
247. When "failed to agree personal terms" and "football" are typed in a google.com search,
nearly 700 entries are returned. "Failed to Agree to Personal Terms", GOOGLE.COM, http:/
www.google.com/search?hl=en&client-firefoxa&rls=org.mozilla%3AenUS%3Aofficial&hs=dVw&
q=failed+to+agree+to+personal+terms&aq=f&oq=&aqi=. "Football", GOOGLE.COM, http://
www.google.com/search?q-football&ie-utf-8&oe=utf-8&aq--t&rls=org.mozilla:en-
US:official&clientrfirefox-a (last visited Oct. 17, 2009);
2009]
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historic clubs as Manchester United, Liverpool FC, and Arsenal.
